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THE SEVENTH ANNUAL
MEDIA AND SOCIETY LECTURE

Protecting the American Playwright
John Weidman†
I want to begin by clarifying something which is going to
become stunningly clear whether I clarify it now or not. I am
not an attorney. I did in fact graduate from law school. I did in
fact take and pass the New York Bar Exam. But to give you a
sense of how long ago that was, when I finished the exam I
celebrated by picking up a six pack of Heineken and going
home to watch the Watergate Hearings.
I have never practiced law. But as President of the
Dramatists Guild of America for the last eight years I have
found myself in the middle of a number of legal collisions, the
most important of which I’m going to talk about today, not from
a lawyer’s perspective—although I may attempt to dazzle you
with a couple of actual citations—but from the perspective of
the playwrights, composers, and lyricists whose interests the
Guild represents.
First, some background: The Dramatists Guild is the
only national organization representing the interests of
playwrights, composers, and lyricists writing for the living
stage.
Founded almost a hundred years ago, the Guild
currently has over 6,000 members nationwide ranging from a
kid in a dorm room somewhere struggling to finish his first one
act play, to established playwrights working on Broadway, OffBroadway, and in regional theaters all over the country.
Members over the years have included George S. Kaufman,
†
President of the Dramatists Guild of America. This speech was delivered
at the Seventh Annual Media and Society Lecture, held on October 25, 2006, at
Brooklyn Law School.
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Eugene O’Neill, Arthur Miller, Lillian Hellman, and Tennessee
Williams. The Guild is governed by a Board of Directors,
elected from its membership, which currently includes such
writers as Edward Albee, Stephen Sondheim, John Guare,
Marsha Norman, and John Patrick Shanley. Past presidents
include Richard Rodgers, Moss Hart, Oscar Hammerstein, Alan
Jay Lerner, Robert Sherwood, and Peter Stone.
Since its inception, the mission of the Guild has been to
assist playwrights in protecting the artistic and economic
integrity of the work which they create. These efforts have
taken a variety of forms, most significantly the development of
a series of standard contracts the terms of which have
guaranteed to playwrights the ability to control the content of
the plays which they write, to control the disposition of those
plays, and to earn a living from those plays if and when they
are produced.
Despite a predictable amount of noisy opposition from
various elements within the theater community, these efforts
have been largely successful. The American theater, organized
around the unique, idiosyncratic voice of the American
playwright, has thrived, first and foremost, because of the
brilliance of quintessentially American dramatists like Eugene
O’Neill, Tennessee Williams, Stephen Sondheim and the
equally brilliant interpretive artists with whom they’ve
collaborated, but also because of the stable framework—both
creative and economic—within which those dramatists and
their partners have been able to do their work.
Where did that stability come from? For as long as
anyone can remember, the community of artists and
businessmen who make theater have shared a common set of
assumptions about how a play or a musical makes its way from
the page to the stage.
Not infrequently, a new production has rung minor
changes on these assumptions, but the basic assumptions have
endured. Everyone has known who did what. Everyone has
known who owned what. Everyone has known who was in
charge and who had the last word. These assumptions were
givens; they were taken for granted.
They are not taken for granted anymore.
Beginning perhaps ten to fifteen years ago, in what is
still a developing but potentially seismic shift in the way
theater is made, these assumptions began to be challenged,
deliberately and aggressively, with consequences as yet
uncertain for the future of the American playwright and, by
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extension, for the future of the American Theater and the
American theater-going public.
The challenges have come, primarily, from two sources:
First, from a group of producers, new to the business, and
largely new to New York, and second, from directors, acting in
concert through their union, the Society of Stage Directors and
Choreographers, or SSD&C.
At their core, both challenges are about the same thing:
copyright. The playwright’s copyright. The playwright’s
undisputed ownership of his play, legally and artistically,
which, heretofore, has been the bedrock constant around which
all theater-making has been organized.
Until now.
First, I want to talk about the challenges being mounted
by producers. But before I do, a brief digression into the
difference between writing for the theater and writing for the
movies.
Playwrights write plays.
Screenwriters write
screenplays. On the most fundamental level, they both engage
in the same creative exercise. The writer sits down in front of a
blank piece of paper and stares at it with a mounting sense of
dread until, as George S. Kaufman said, blood begins to seep
from his forehead. Writing can be painful, whether you’re
writing a play or a screenplay. But the intermittent sense of
suicidal desperation which playwrights and screenwriters
sometimes share is about the only thing they share.
A screenwriter is an employee. The work he does is
work for hire. From the beginning, he understands that
everything he writes will immediately become the property of
the studio which employs him.
As legal author of the film, that studio can change the
content of the screenwriter’s script at will. His pirate captain
can become a teenage runaway, his teenage runaway a Cocker
Spaniel, his original story, set in Boston during the War of
1812, can be moved to the fifth moon of Jupiter.
Sooner or later, things like this will happen, because
things like this always happen, and when they do, the
screenwriter will feel talentless, humiliated, and, most
importantly, every single author’s impulse that made him want
to be a writer in the first place will be ground into the dust.
What about the playwright? The playwright is an
independent contractor. He owns his work and is free to
dispose of it as he sees fit. If a producer wants to mount a
production of his play, the playwright will grant the producer a
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defined package of performance rights for a limited time while
reserving all other rights to himself. The producer will not be
able to hire a director, or actors, or designers to work on his
play without his approval. And no one will be able to change a
word of what he’s written without his permission.
So why would anyone choose to write for the movies
when they could write for the theater? The answer is—as it so
often is—money.
Screenwriters are actually paid to write. The typical
studio deal involves a hefty advance paid to the writer before
he goes to work, and as he continues working, he can count on
receiving a predictable series of additional payments.
The playwright, on the other hand, works for nothing.
Some plays are written on commission, but the vast majority
are simply written—by someone, somewhere with an impulse
and an idea.
The playwright will be compensated, if at all, not with
studio-style advances and step deal payments, but with a small
prospective sliver of every dollar which may or may not one day
come in at the box office. Which means he will not see any
return on his labors unless and until a producer decides to
produce his play and an audience decides to buy tickets to see
it.
So why does he do it?
He does it because it is in the theater, and only in the
theater, that the dramatic writer can retain ownership and
control of the work which he creates. He does it because it is in
the theater, and only in the theater, that he knows his own
unique, idiosyncratic voice will be heard, unedited and
uncompromised.
Which brings us back to copyright. That the playwright
owns his copyright is both a reflection of the fact that the
theater is a writer’s medium, and a legal firewall guaranteeing
that it will remain that way.
Assaults on that copyright would have been unheard of
thirty years ago. But as Jerry Brown said, that was then and
this is now. And now, as I have said, assaults on the
playwright’s copyright are being mounted by both producers
and directors.
First the producers.
Twenty-five years ago, something happened on
Broadway.
The musical Cats opened, and in certain
fundamental ways, the commercial theater was changed
forever. Prior to Cats, a hit show was a show which ran for
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two, perhaps three years. A smash hit, like My Fair Lady,
might run for five or six. Cats ran for eighteen years. And
even more significantly, the London production, which had
been replicated on Broadway, was then replicated in dozens of
other Broadway-like productions around the world.
In the old days, meaning let’s say the 1960s, the
producers of a hit Broadway show might send out a national
touring company, after which they might mount the show in
London’s West End.
From the point of view of the producers, the investors,
and the authors, the income from these productions would
certainly have been substantial, but not so substantial as to
call attention to itself outside the relatively insulated economic
world of the theater.
Cats, along with sister shows like Les Miserables and
Phantom of the Opera, changed all that. The money to be made
from two dozen identical versions of a hit show, playing to sold
out houses in two dozen cities around the world, was clearly
enormous. Indeed, in January of this year, Variety reported
that Phantom of the Opera had become the most successful
entertainment venture of all time—more successful than Star
Wars, more successful than Harry Potter—grossing 1.9 billion
dollars in the United States, 3.2 billion dollars world wide,
from ticket sales alone.1
Clearly, these were sums of money not to be left in the
hands or the pockets of what had heretofore been thought of as
a mere Broadway producer.
About whom a brief aside:
Max Bialystock, Mel
Brooks’s super-shyster impresario, when accused of defrauding
the investors in his new musical, Springtime for Hitler, defends
himself to the judge as follows: “It’s true, your honor, I’ve
spent a lifetime lying and cheating and stealing, but I couldn’t
help myself. I was a Broadway Producer.”2
It should be noted that at the first staged reading of
Brooks’s show this line got the afternoon’s biggest laugh—from
an audience made up almost entirely of Broadway producers.
But in what I am still referring to as the old days, for every
producer like a Max Bialystock or a David Merrick, there were
half a dozen Kermit Bloomgartens, Leland Haywards, and
Harold Princes—consummate professionals who had made
1

Zachary Pincus-Roth, Movies Aren't the Only B.O. Monsters, VARIETY, Jan.

2

THE PRODUCERS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968).

9, 2006.
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lives for themselves in the theater, perhaps first as stage
managers, then as company managers, then finally as fullfledged producers. These were men and women as dedicated to
the theater as the most dedicated playwright. They survive
today in the person of producers like Manny Azenberg and Liz
McCann.
But with the geysers of money tapped into by shows like
Cats and Les Miserables, it was only a matter of time before a
new breed of producer appeared on the scene. And when that
new breed arrived, predictably, it came from Hollywood.
First came Disney, mounting enormously successful
stage versions of its animated features like Beauty and the
Beast and The Lion King. Then came Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Universal, and a number of other studios, often on their own,
sometimes partnering with experienced Broadway presenters.
When in Rome, most people make at least some attempt
to do as the Romans do. In this case, however, in at least one
crucial area, the attempt was minimal.
What the most aggressive of the movie studios brought
with them was a desire to do business, not according to the
theater model which put the playwright in first position, but
according to the Hollywood model, in which the producing
studio owned the author’s copyright and writers could be hired
and fired at will.
Individual writers, supported by organizations like the
Dramatists Guild, have for the most part been able to resist the
pressure to work under these conditions. Usually, by simply
refusing to do it. But the pressures are intense, and with the
appearance of more and more studio-produced musicals like
Tarzan and Aida, those pressures are only going to grow more
intense.
Case in point: Dreamworks Animation is gearing up to
produce a stage version of its wildly successful animated
feature film, Shrek. The first Shrek grossed 455 million
dollars.3 Its sequel grossed 880 million dollars.4 Add to this the
vast revenues from toys, t-shirts, and who knows what else,
and one would have to agree with the executives at
Dreamworks Animation that the Shrek imprint represents a
franchise of goldmine-like proportions.

3
See All-Time Worldwide Boxoffice Chart, http://einsiders.com/gross/top150world.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
4
Id.
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As such, the studio would argue, it has a duty to its
shareholders to maintain control of anything and everything
which appears under the Shrek banner. And that control
would extend to the content, to every line of dialogue uttered in
a dramatic adaptation.
Who could disagree?
The appearance behind a drugstore counter of one
package of green, ogre-sized Shrek condoms could do
immeasurable damage to the Shrek franchise. As could a
stubborn lyricist who insisted on making a green, ogre-sized
Shrek condom joke in the middle of the opening number of
Shrek: The Musical.
So what’s to be done?
The studio’s interest in
maintaining control of the content of the stage version of Shrek
seems irreconcilable with the theatrical mandate which gives
the playwright ultimate control of the work which he creates.
Apparently a stand-off, but maybe one that doesn’t
matter that much. You could make a case that a great big
Broadway musical version of an animated film like Shrek is sui
generis. That like other great big Broadway musicals based on
animated films it has so little to do with what we traditionally
think of as theater—Chekhov, Beckett, Rodgers &
Hammerstein—that it’s actually O.K. if it makes its own rules.
That whatever those rules are, you can build a wall around
them and keep them quarantined.
You could make that case, but you’d regret it. Because
if the author’s copyright in a Shrek-sized musical migrates
from the bookwriter, composer, and lyricist to the producer, it
will only be a matter of time before the producer of a straight
play demands the same arrangement.
Why? Because as a general rule, what one producer
gets, all producers want. And the lowest common denominator
deal tends to become the deal.
In addition, the producer will argue, with some justice,
that in order to raise money from his investors he must
demonstrate that he has a deal which will protect their money
at least as well as the next producer’s deal. And if the next
producer owns the author’s copyright and he doesn’t, he may
have a hard time capitalizing his show.
So—what we are looking at is indeed a slippery slope,
down which the playwright’s copyright runs the risk of sliding
into oblivion.
Imagine for a moment that this change has already
taken place. Now imagine that Arthur Miller is still alive and
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that he has just completed a play called Death of a Salesman.
A producer has optioned it, put it into production, and that
producer is now standing at the back of the theater as the
curtain comes down at the end of the first preview. The
audience looks shell-shocked. Middle-aged men are weeping
openly as they walk past him up the aisle. Understandably
nervous, the producer wonders if maybe the Willy Loman story
might not run just a little bit longer if it didn’t have such a
downbeat ending. After all, Willy doesn’t have to drive his car
into a bridge abutment. Why can’t all the Lomans—Linda,
Happy, Biff, maybe even the hooker from the hotel in Boston—
why can’t they all pile into the family jalopy and take off on a
comical but heartwarming cross-country road trip in which
they confront their demons, defeat them, and start a new life in
Alaska with Uncle Ben?
Miller doesn’t want to write it? The producer fires him
and finds somebody who will.
And now, on to the directors.
Beginning perhaps ten years ago, theater directors
launched an aggressive campaign to establish a new,
independent property right—a director’s copyright—in the
work which they create.
Speaking through their union,
directors have gone to great pains to emphasize that, unlike
producers, they are not attempting to wrest copyright away
from the playwright.
Which is true.
They then go on to emphasize that the creation of a
director’s copyright will have no impact on playwrights or on
the way in which theater is and has been made for decades.
Which is not true.
On the contrary, if a director’s copyright is ever
established, it will drastically limit a playwright’s ability to
control the work which he creates, it will inevitably undermine
the spirit of trust and openness which is essential to the
collaborative process that makes theater happen, and it will
have a deeply disruptive, potentially paralyzing effect on
theatrical production generally.
Unlike playwrights, directors are employees. When a
producer acquires the live performance rights in a play, he
begins to hire the people who will make those performances
possible: A set designer, a lighting designer, a costume
designer, actors of course, and most importantly, a director.
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It is the director’s status as an employee which has
allowed directors as a group to organize, and to be certified as a
labor union.
And it is the directors’ union, the SSD&C, which has led
the fight to create an intellectual property right where none
has previously existed. Ted Pappas, former President of the
SSD&C, writing in the February, 1999 issue of American
Theater Magazine, attempted to take this non-existent right for
granted.
“Property rights,” wrote Mr. Pappas, “give a director or
a choreographer ownership of the staging they create for a
production of a play or a musical.”5 This is certainly true of
choreographers, who are specifically identified in the Copyright
Act of 1976. But it is not true of directors.
In fact, there is no recognized property right that gives a
director ownership of any aspect of a theatrical production.
Traditionally, directors have not attempted to copyright their
work, and no court has ever recognized the validity of a
director’s copyright claim.
Ron Shechtman, attorney for the SSD&C, has referred
to the law in this area as “murky.” In order to support this
characterization, he and his union rely heavily on two cases,
and perhaps one other, recently decided.
The first, Mantello v. Hall,6 is generally cited as having
supported the notion that directors can copyright their stage
directions. In fact, it did nothing of the kind.
The case arose out of a production of Terrence McNally’s
play Love! Valor! Compassion! mounted at the Caldwell
Theater in Boca Raton, Florida in 1996.7 In 1994, Joe
Mantello—a brilliant director with whom I have had the
immense pleasure of working—staged the original production
of Love! Valor! Compassion! in New York, where it won the
Tony Award for Best Play.8
Two years later, Mantello’s attention was directed to the
Caldwell production, which was reportedly a virtual replica of
his New York production, and he sued, alleging among other
things, infringement of a copyright which he had acquired
when he filed a copy of McNally’s script with his stage

5
6
7
8

Ted Pappas, Protecting the Director, AM THEATER MAG., Feb. 1999, at 6.
Mantello v. Hall, No. 97cv8196 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 21, 1997).
Id.
Id.
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directions written in the margins with the U.S. Copyright
Office.9
Mantello v. Hall was settled before it went to trial.10
Mantello’s copyright filing had been processed by the Copyright
Office without any opinion offered as to whether the stage
directions which he had filed were in fact copyrightable or not.
The court reached no decision on the matter.
In response to defendant theater’s motion for summary
judgment, the court did find that Mantello had in fact received
a copyright certificate from the Copyright Office. But both the
filing of the claim and the issuance of the certificate were
purely mechanical.
Nevertheless, “Possession of this
certificate,” said Judge Ryskamp, “creates the presumption
that the work in question is copyrightable.”11 Defendant’s
assertion that stage directions are not copyrightable as a
matter of law might or might not have been resolved at trial,
but to quote Judge Ryskamp again, “with the record in its
present undeveloped state, the Court cannot grant summary
judgment on this basis.”12
And that’s as far as it went.
Another, more recent case, Einhorn v. Mergatroyd
Productions,13 raised a director’s copyright claim in a similar,
but slightly different context. Plaintiff Einhorn was hired by
defendant Mergatroyd to direct playwright Nancy McLernan’s
play, Tam Lin.14 Einhorn was fired before the play opened.15
Subsequent to his firing, he filed a copy of McLernan’s script
with some of his stage directions written in the margins with
the Copyright Office, a filing which—to quote Judge Kaplan in
his opinion delivered from the bench—eventually “matured into
a certificate of registration.”16
Whether or not that certificate had any legal force—
indeed, whether, as a matter of law, stage directions are
copyrightable at all, was an issue the court never reached—
9
10

Id.
See Jesse Green, Exit, Pursued by a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 2,

at 1.
11

Order Granting in Part and Den. in Part Mot. to Dismiss and/or for Summ.
J. at 14, Mantello v. Hall, No. 97cv8196 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 1997).
12
Id.
13
426 F.Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
14
Id. at 191.
15
Id. at 192.
16
Transcript of Record at 12, Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F.Supp. 2d
189 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006) (No. 05 Civ. 8600).
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because prior to Judge Kaplan delivering his opinion, plaintiff
director Einhorn had agreed to withdraw the registration.
And that’s as far as that went.
Finally, the granddaddy of all these cases, Gutierrez v.
DeSantis.17 It was the first one to stir the pot and the one
which demonstrates most clearly the potentially devastating
effect of a director’s copyright on the way playwrights do their
work, and on the vitality of theatrical production generally.
The case involved a production of Frank Loesser’s The Most
Happy Fella, directed at the Goodspeed Opera House and
subsequently on Broadway, by Gerry Gutierrez in 1991.18
As would later be the case in Einhorn and Mantello,
Gutierrez attempted to copyright his work by filing a copy of
his stage directions, written in the margins of Frank Loesser’s
script, with the U.S. Copyright Office.
As has been noted, such a filing is simply that—a filing.
It does not establish a copyright, and in fact, there has never
been a judicial determination that stage directions, filed by a
director, are copyrightable.
But for the sake of argument, let’s say they are. Let’s
say Mr. Gutierrez could and did acquire copyright ownership of
his staging of The Most Happy Fella. What would be the
consequence?
The Most Happy Fella opened on Broadway in 1956. In
the thirty-five years between that opening and Mr. Gutierrez’s
revival, there must have been thousands of productions of this
brilliant musical play.
If Mr. Gutierrez could acquire copyright ownership of
his staging, then the directors of each and every one of these
productions could have acquired copyright ownership of theirs
as well. Had this happened, over the course of the last four
decades The Most Happy Fella would have gradually ceased to
exist as an independent piece of dramatic literature, giving way
instead to a multitude of “Most Happy Fellas,” each one a legal
partnership between Frank Loesser and a director whose
production he and his heirs had, in all likelihood, never even
seen.
Should such copyright partnerships ever come into
existence, they would clearly operate as liens on a playwright’s
play, restricting—often in unknown and unpredictable ways—
17
18

Gutierrez v. DeSantis, No. 95-1949 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 22, 1995).
Green, supra note 10.
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the playwright’s fundamental right to control what he has
created.
But beyond that, they would have a potentially
devastating effect on the facility and vitality of theatrical
production.
For example. If at some point in the future, a theater
wished to produce The Most Happy Fella, they would be faced
with a choice. They could examine—how?—each of the then
existing copyrighted productions and select the one they
wished to reproduce. Or they could proceed with their own
original production, running the risk that a particular piece of
business, or a stage effect, or their overall approach would be
attacked by a director as an infringement of his previously
copyrighted version.
Of course, The Most Happy Fella is merely illustrative.
Even plays which are currently in the public domain,
plays which have been freely available to producers and
directors and most importantly to the public for hundreds of
years—Hamlet, King Lear—would acquire de facto copyrights
as more and more directors asserted ownership of their
versions of these classics. Producing them would become
increasingly problematic.
And risky.
Theaters do not want to be sued. Indeed, most of them
cannot afford the expense of defending a lawsuit. And if
directors are able to copyright their work, the day will
inevitably come—and soon—when a theater decides to cancel a
production simply because they have been threatened by a
director who perceives—rightly or wrongly, it doesn’t matter—
that the theater’s production will infringe on a version which
belongs to him.
Infringement, of course, requires copying. And copying
requires access. But directors are not attorneys, they are
artists. And there are plenty of artists—and I am not
exempting playwrights—who are prone to see their influence in
other people’s entirely original work. It is not difficult to
initiate a lawsuit. It is even less difficult to write a letter
threatening one.
Which brings us back to the SSD&C.
The directors’ union lays great emphasis on the fact that
it has acted with restraint, that it has only pursued cases in
which a director’s work has been copied intentionally, and in
which the copying was substantial and pervasive.
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These limits are meant to be reassuring. But obviously
they are self-imposed. And if a director’s copyright is ever
established, it will belong, not to the union, but to directors
individually.
Consider Mr. Mantello and Mr. Gutierrez again. Both
have said that the directing work they’ve done has not always
risen to a level where they personally felt it deserved copyright
protection. Yes it did, said Mr. Mantello of his award-winning
production of Love! Valor! Compassion! No it didn’t, of his
award-winning production of Glenngary Glenn Ross. Yes it did,
said Mr. Gutierrez, of his award winning production of The
Most Happy Fella.
No it didn’t, of his award-winning
production of The Heiress.
Could any judgment be more subjective? What if Mr.
Mantello disagreed with Mr. Gutierrez, and argued that Mr.
Gutierrez’ staging of The Heiress did deserve copyright
protection? Who would be the better judge?
In a letter to the New York Times, director Charles
Marowitz offered the following:
As a director who has found his staging appropriated by less
resourceful colleagues, I know that without the text prompting
motivation, movement and gestures, no director would be able even
to begin ‘staging’ a play.
Directorial conception, however, is
altogether different from staging and adds an entirely new
dimension to a dramatist’s work. Reinterpretations of both modern
or classic plays should be entitled to copyright protection because
they are the original outgrowth of a director’s imagination.19

But who decides? Who determines when a “director’s
imagination” has been sufficiently activated to give birth to a
copyrightable piece of work? Who decides when it hasn’t? Are
objective standards even possible? And isn’t any line in the
sand which makes some direction copyrightable and some not
an invitation to an avalanche of litigation casting a cloud over
some theatrical productions and paralyzing others?
Clearly, I would say yes. I would also say that I share
the universal feeling that something fundamentally unfair has
happened when a “less resourceful” director, to use Mr.
Marowitz’s phrase, puts up a production which clearly
duplicates one mounted by someone else. If an artist is proud
of what he’s done, he wants credit for it. He certainly does not

19
Charles Marowitz, Letter to the Editor, Stage Copyrights; What the
Director Brings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006 (responding to Green, supra note 10).
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want someone else taking credit for it. And without question,
what happens in a case like this feels instinctively like
stealing.
In the end, of course, it’s only stealing if the thing taken
belonged to somebody. And not everything which feels unfair,
or is unfair, can or should be corrected by the courts.
At first glance, it would appear that the SSD&C’s
campaign to create a director’s copyright is an attempt to
correct the fundamental unfairness described above. But let’s
take a second glance.
Interviewed by the New York Times for an article about
director’s copyright and the Einhorn case, SSD&C attorney
Ron Shechtman had this to say:
If it’s truly a collaborative art form, then why is it only the author
who participates in the subsidiary rights that flow from a successful
New York production? The appropriate resolution is to give fair
credit to all the artists’ contributions. One day, it may end up that
the author gets eighty percent, the director ten percent, the original
cast X and the designers Z. Because, at bottom, this is all about
money.20

“Because at bottom, this is all about money.”
Well, maybe it is, and maybe it isn’t, but for the
moment, let’s take Mr. Shechtman at his word. If the union’s
push to establish a director’s copyright is even mostly about
money, and even more specifically money generated from a
first New York production, then the director should be looking,
not to the playwright, but to the New York producer for his
payday.
When a producer takes the risk involved in mounting a
new play or musical on Broadway, he is giving the authors
something of enormous value beyond the production itself. He
is giving them the visibility and status which attaches to
having written a “Broadway show.”
This visibility immediately increases the value of all the
subsidiary rights which the authors retain. These include the
right to license stock and amateur productions of the show, the
right to sell it to the movies, the right to authorize a future
Broadway revival, and so on.
In recognition of this value added, the authors grant the
producer a participation, and a substantial one, in all revenues

20

Green, supra note 10.
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they realize from the exploitation of these rights for a defined
period of time.
The revenues flow to the authors because, as authors,
the sub rights belong to them. But they share them with the
producer in recognition of the production he mounted, and by
extension, in recognition of the contributions made by all of the
artists the producer hired to make that first production
possible.
Foremost among those artists is, of course, the director,
who has negotiated an employment contract with the producer
specifying the compensation he will receive in exchange for his
labors. If, as part of his compensation, the director, and the
director’s union, feel he should be entitled to a participation in
the author’s sub rights, then it is not to the author, but to the
producer’s pre-negotiated share of those sub rights that he
should logically look when he is negotiating his contract.
Copyright, as wielded by the SSD&C, has begun to feel
like a sledgehammer. If directors think they can use it to
surgically remove a small stream of income from the
playwright’s subsidiary rights, then not only do they have their
hands on the wrong weapon, but if they continue to swing it,
aggressively and irresponsibly, the law of unintended
consequences says the landscape of theatrical production in
this country may be altered in ways which no one can entirely
predict, but which we may all, directors included, come to
regret.
Copyright law, as I understand it, exists to maximize
the creative output of artists, so that their work can enrich the
marketplace of ideas necessary to inform and challenge the
citizens of a vital, vibrant democracy.
What is and isn’t entitled to copyright protection should
be determined by this largest goal.
David Mamet once said that people come to the theater
to be told the truth. From Sophocles to Shakespeare to O’Neill,
the voice that has spoken that truth has been the voice of the
playwright.
Anything we do, whether intentionally or
inadvertently, which hobbles that voice or hampers access to it,
we do as a society at our peril.

